diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index cec29eb3c40..a800d220b58 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ config X86
 					  && !BOARD_HAS_TIMING_FUNCTIONS \
 					  && !SOC_HAS_TIMING_FUNCTIONS
 	select ARCH_HAS_STACK_CANARIES_TLS
+	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_MEM_MAPPED_STACKS if X86_MMU && !DEMAND_PAGING
 	help
 	  x86 architecture
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/core/Kconfig.ia32 b/arch/x86/core/Kconfig.ia32
index b24981c0606..d789c87eb80 100644
--- a/arch/x86/core/Kconfig.ia32
+++ b/arch/x86/core/Kconfig.ia32
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ config X86_STACK_PROTECTION
 	select SET_GDT
 	select GDT_DYNAMIC
 	select X86_ENABLE_TSS
+	imply THREAD_STACK_MEM_MAPPED if !DEMAND_PAGING
 	help
 	  This option leverages the MMU to cause a system fatal error if the
 	  bounds of the current process stack are overflowed. This is done
diff --git a/arch/x86/core/Kconfig.intel64 b/arch/x86/core/Kconfig.intel64
index 64021959034..913bb0e794d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/core/Kconfig.intel64
+++ b/arch/x86/core/Kconfig.intel64
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ config X86_STACK_PROTECTION
 	bool
 	default y if HW_STACK_PROTECTION
 	select THREAD_STACK_INFO
+	imply THREAD_STACK_MEM_MAPPED
 	help
 	  This option leverages the MMU to cause a system fatal error if the
 	  bounds of the current process stack are overflowed. This is done
diff --git a/arch/x86/core/fatal.c b/arch/x86/core/fatal.c
index bd5e3a51d91..370386d4af9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/core/fatal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/core/fatal.c
@@ -86,6 +86,40 @@ bool z_x86_check_stack_bounds(uintptr_t addr, size_t size, uint16_t cs)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_THREAD_STACK_MEM_MAPPED
+/**
+ * Check if the fault is in the guard pages.
+ *
+ * @param addr Address to be tested.
+ *
+ * @return True Address is in guard pages, false otherwise.
+ */
+__pinned_func
+bool z_x86_check_guard_page(uintptr_t addr)
+{
+	struct k_thread *thread = _current;
+	uintptr_t start, end;
+
+	/* Front guard size - before thread stack area */
+	start = (uintptr_t)thread->stack_info.mapped.addr - CONFIG_MMU_PAGE_SIZE;
+	end = (uintptr_t)thread->stack_info.mapped.addr;
+
+	if ((addr >= start) && (addr < end)) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	/* Rear guard size - after thread stack area */
+	start = (uintptr_t)thread->stack_info.mapped.addr + thread->stack_info.mapped.sz;
+	end = start + CONFIG_MMU_PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	if ((addr >= start) && (addr < end)) {
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_THREAD_STACK_MEM_MAPPED */
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_EXCEPTION_DEBUG
 
 static inline uintptr_t esf_get_code(const z_arch_esf_t *esf)
@@ -441,6 +475,14 @@ void z_x86_page_fault_handler(z_arch_esf_t *esf)
 		z_x86_fatal_error(K_ERR_STACK_CHK_FAIL, esf);
 	}
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_THREAD_STACK_MEM_MAPPED
+	void *fault_addr = z_x86_cr2_get();
+
+	if (z_x86_check_guard_page((uintptr_t)fault_addr)) {
+		z_x86_fatal_error(K_ERR_STACK_CHK_FAIL, esf);
+	}
+#endif
+
 	z_x86_fatal_error(K_ERR_CPU_EXCEPTION, esf);
 	CODE_UNREACHABLE;
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/core/ia32/thread.c b/arch/x86/core/ia32/thread.c
index 7830298f72e..b639bb59fdf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/core/ia32/thread.c
+++ b/arch/x86/core/ia32/thread.c
@@ -79,7 +79,10 @@ void arch_new_thread(struct k_thread *thread, k_thread_stack_t *stack,
 	void *swap_entry;
 	struct _x86_initial_frame *initial_frame;
 
-#if CONFIG_X86_STACK_PROTECTION
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_STACK_PROTECTION) && !defined(CONFIG_THREAD_STACK_MEM_MAPPED)
+	/* This unconditionally set the first page of stack as guard page,
+	 * which is only needed if the stack is not memory mapped.
+	 */
 	z_x86_set_stack_guard(stack);
 #endif
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/core/intel64/thread.c b/arch/x86/core/intel64/thread.c
index e419a92d206..f26f25ab5f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/core/intel64/thread.c
+++ b/arch/x86/core/intel64/thread.c
@@ -32,7 +32,10 @@ void arch_new_thread(struct k_thread *thread, k_thread_stack_t *stack,
 	void *switch_entry;
 	struct x86_initial_frame *iframe;
 
-#if CONFIG_X86_STACK_PROTECTION
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_STACK_PROTECTION) && !defined(CONFIG_THREAD_STACK_MEM_MAPPED)
+	/* This unconditionally set the first page of stack as guard page,
+	 * which is only needed if the stack is not memory mapped.
+	 */
 	z_x86_set_stack_guard(stack);
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_USERSPACE
diff --git a/arch/x86/core/userspace.c b/arch/x86/core/userspace.c
index 7ad77166b0f..dbe40b2bda0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/core/userspace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/core/userspace.c
@@ -69,8 +69,13 @@ void z_x86_swap_update_page_tables(struct k_thread *incoming)
 void *z_x86_userspace_prepare_thread(struct k_thread *thread)
 {
 	void *initial_entry;
+
 	struct z_x86_thread_stack_header *header =
+#ifdef CONFIG_THREAD_STACK_MEM_MAPPED
+		(struct z_x86_thread_stack_header *)thread->stack_info.mapped.addr;
+#else
 		(struct z_x86_thread_stack_header *)thread->stack_obj;
+#endif /* CONFIG_THREAD_STACK_MEM_MAPPED */
 
 	thread->arch.psp =
 		header->privilege_stack + sizeof(header->privilege_stack);
diff --git a/include/zephyr/arch/x86/thread_stack.h b/include/zephyr/arch/x86/thread_stack.h
index 6602d85784c..f22bf4d6853 100644
--- a/include/zephyr/arch/x86/thread_stack.h
+++ b/include/zephyr/arch/x86/thread_stack.h
@@ -14,16 +14,20 @@
 #define ARCH_STACK_PTR_ALIGN 4UL
 #endif
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_X86_STACK_PROTECTION) || defined(CONFIG_USERSPACE)
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_STACK_PROTECTION) || defined(CONFIG_USERSPACE) \
+	|| defined(CONFIG_THREAD_STACK_MEM_MAPPED)
 #define Z_X86_STACK_BASE_ALIGN	CONFIG_MMU_PAGE_SIZE
 #else
 #define Z_X86_STACK_BASE_ALIGN	ARCH_STACK_PTR_ALIGN
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_USERSPACE
+#if defined(CONFIG_USERSPACE) || defined(CONFIG_THREAD_STACK_MEM_MAPPED)
 /* If user mode enabled, expand any stack size to fill a page since that is
  * the access control granularity and we don't want other kernel data to
  * unintentionally fall in the latter part of the page
+ *
+ * This is also true when memory mapped stacks are used with since
+ * access control applies to one page at a time.
  */
 #define Z_X86_STACK_SIZE_ALIGN	CONFIG_MMU_PAGE_SIZE
 #else
@@ -34,17 +38,38 @@
 /* With both hardware stack protection and userspace enabled, stacks are
  * arranged as follows:
  *
+ * --- Without stack being memory mapped:
  * High memory addresses
  * +-----------------------------------------+
  * | Thread stack (varies)                   |
  * +-----------------------------------------+
  * | Privilege elevation stack               |
- * |      (4096 bytes)                       |
+ * |   (CONFIG_PRIVILEGED_STACK_SIZE)        |
  * +-----------------------------------------+
  * | Guard page (4096 bytes)                 |
+ * |   - 'guard_page' in struct              |
+ * |     z_x86_thread_stack_header           |
+ * +-----------------------------------------+
+ * Low Memory addresses
+ *
+ * --- With stack being memory mapped:
+ * High memory addresses
+ * +-----------------------------------------+
+ * | Guard page (empty page)                 |
+ * +-----------------------------------------+
+ * | Thread stack (varies)                   |
+ * +-----------------------------------------+
+ * | Privilege elevation stack               |
+ * |   (CONFIG_PRIVILEGED_STACK_SIZE)        |
+ * +-----------------------------------------+
+ * | Guard page (empty page)                 |
  * +-----------------------------------------+
  * Low Memory addresses
  *
+ * Without memory mapped stacks, the guard page is actually allocated
+ * as part of the stack struct, which takes up physical memory during
+ * linking.
+ *
  * Privilege elevation stacks are fixed-size. All the pages containing the
  * thread stack are marked as user-accessible. The guard page is marked
  * read-only to catch stack overflows in supervisor mode.
@@ -62,7 +87,7 @@
  * privileged mode stack.
  */
 struct z_x86_thread_stack_header {
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_STACK_PROTECTION
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_STACK_PROTECTION) && !defined(CONFIG_THREAD_STACK_MEM_MAPPED)
 	char guard_page[CONFIG_MMU_PAGE_SIZE];
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_USERSPACE